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INTRODUCTION

The inherent conflict between section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act' (the Act) and the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act has troubled the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board), courts, and commentators for many years. 2 Section 7 guarantees workers the right to refrain from concerted activities,3 while
section 8(b)(1)(A) states that a union commits an unfair labor
practice if it restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their
section 7 rights.4 The conflict between these two sections of the
Act arises in the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A), which permits a
union to govern its internal affairs without violating section
8(b) (1)(A). 5 In particular, this conflict has perplexed the Board
and courts when a union member has attempted to resign from the
union during a strike. Unions have claimed that the proviso gives
them an absolute right to restrict resignations.6 Employees, on the
other hand, have argued that the proviso does not give a union the
authority to restrict resignations because the restriction would violate the employee's section 7 right to refrain from concerted
activities. 7
1.
2.

29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
See, e.g., W. CONNOLLY, JR. & M. CONNOLLY, WORK STOPPAGES AND UNION RESPONSIBILITY (1977); Gould, Solidarity Forever-or Hardly Ever: Union Discipline, Taft-Hartley,
and the Right of Union Members to Resign, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 74 (1980); Johannesen,
Disciplinary Fines as Interference with Protected Rights: Section 8(b)(1)(A), 24 LAB. L.J.
268 (1973); Levin & Werhan, Restrictions on the Right to Resign: Can a Member's Freedom
to "Escape the Union Rule" Be Overcome by Union Boilerplate?, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
397 (1973-74); Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation,and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897 (1975); Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 1022 (1976); Note, Union Power to
Discipline Members Who Resign, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1536 (1973); Comment, Union Security
and Union Members' Freedom to Resign: The National Labor Relations Board's ThirtyDay Rule in Dalmo Victor, 14 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 593 (1983).
3. Section 7 provides in pertinent part that "[e]mployees shall have the right ... to
refrain from any or all [concerted] ... activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in section [8](a)(3)." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
4. Section 8(b)(1)(A) states in pertinent part that "[ilt shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7] ....
" 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(1)(A) (1982).
5. The proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) states: "Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair
the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein . . . ." Id. (emphasis in original).
6. See, e.g., Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3203 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1984) (No. 83-1894) (Rockford-Beloit).
7. Id. at 58-59; see W. CONNOLLY, JR. & M. CONNOLLY, supra note 2, at 209-10; Johannesen, supra note 2, at 277-78; Schatzki, supra note 2, at 914 n.45.
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Until recently neither the Board nor the courts had defined
the extent to which a union may restrict its members' right to resign. Within the past year, however, the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Ninth and Seventh Circuits and the Board addressed this issue and reached conflicting results.8 The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari to resolve this question.'
This Recent Development contends that a union restriction on
a member's right to resign constitutes an unfair labor practice
under section 8(b)(1)(A). Part II of this Recent Development focuses on judicial and Board treatment of the inherent conflict between an employee's section 7 right to refrain from collective activity and a union's authority to regulate internal affairs. Part III
examines three recent decisions addressing a union's authority to
restrict a member's right to resign. Finally, part IV suggests that
the Supreme Court should apply the Scofield v. NLRB' ° three-part
test to union rules restricting resignation. Part IV also asserts that
while the union rules may pass the first part of the Scofield test,
they definitely fail the second and third parts of the test.
II.

JUDICIAL AND BOARD TREATMENT OF THE INHERENT CONFLICT

BETWEEN SECTIONS

7

AND

8(B)(1)(A): PRE-Dalmo Victor

As early as 1954, the Board addressed the right of a union to
fine its members for crossing a picket line and returning to work
during an economic strike." The Supreme Court, however, did not
resolve this question until 1967 when it decided NLRB v. AllisChalmers Manufacturing.12 In Allis-Chalmers the Court held that
a union did not violate section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by bringing a
state action to collect fines imposed on members who crossed the
union picket line and returned to work during a lawful economic
strike.' 3 First, the majority noted that Congress designed national
8. See Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984) (Dalmo Victor
I); Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d 57; IAM, Local Lodge 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi), 270
N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1257 (June 22, 1984).
9. Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d 57, cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3203 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1984)
(No. 83-1894).
10. 394 U.S. 423 (1969); see infra text accompanying note 33 (Scofield test).
11. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
12. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
13. Id. at 178. The Act does not protect a union that fines members who engage in
punishable conduct during unlawful union activity. See Insurance Workers Int'l Union, Local 60 (John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.), 236 N.L.R.B. 440, 441 (1978) (Board stating in
dicta that a union violates the Act if it disciplines members for reprehensible conduct during unprotected union activity); Local 1101 Communications Workers & New York Tel. Co.,
208 N.L.R.B. 267, 267 (1974) (union fines imposed on members who crossed the picket line
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labor policy to assist unions in maintaining their bargaining
power.' 4 The Court emphasized that a union's authority to protect
its status by reasonably disciplining members who violate membership rules and regulations is an integral part of federal labor policy
and essential during a strike. 5 Second, the Court implied that discipline and the method of enforcement are part of the contract between the member and his union, and the Court felt responsible
for enforcing the contract. 6
The Court then focused on the legislative history of section
8(b) (1)(A). After determining that Congress did not intend to prohibit "traditional internal union discipline in general, or disciplinary fines in particular,' 7 the Court concluded that the Act perduring an unlawful strike violated § 8(b)(1)(A)); CWA, Local 1127 (New York Tel. Co.), 208
N.L.R.B. 258, 260 (1974) (unlawful strike); see also NLRB v. GAIU Local 13-B, Graphic
Arts Int'l Union, 682 F.2d 304, 307-09 (2d Cir. 1982) (union violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by disciplining a member for engaging in unprotected activity that did not violate the Act or the
collective bargaining agreement, but still would jeopardize the member's job), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1200 (1983).
14. 388 U.S. at 181; see Gould, supra note 2, at 93; Levin & Werhan, supra note 2, at
400-01.
15. 388 U.S. at 181. The NLRB contended that the union's power to expel a member
for his offending conduct under the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) sufficiently served the purpose of
maintaining union strength to negate the need for fines. Id. at 183. The Court, in rejecting
this argument, reasoned that such an interpretation would not effectuate the policies of the
Act. Id. at 183-84. Although expelling a member from a strong union is a far more severe
penalty than a fine because of the value of union membership, the penalty of expulsion from
a weak union is not as harsh as a fine because of the diminished value of union membership.
If a weak union does not have the authority to fine members, the union may have little
choice but to condone its members' transgressions because expulsion would diminish further
the power of the union. Disciplinary fines play a necessary role in aiding weaker unions, an
important policy of the Act. Id.
16. Id. at 182 (quoting Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do
in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 180 (1960)). The Court reached this conclusion because the contract theory of labor relations law widely prevailed when Congress enacted § 8(b)(1)(A). Id.
Under the contract theory union membership created a contract that imposed obligations on
the member; the court's role was to enforce the contract. Johannesen, supra note 2, at 274.
Commentators have criticized the contract theory because it insufficiently incorporates important considerations of labor relations policy. See, e.g., id. at 274-75; Levin & Werhan,
supra note 2, at 400. Although the Supreme Court never has expressly overruled the contract theory language in Allis-Chalmers, the Court has rejected the unions' contract theory
arguments. See Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 89 (1973) (per curiam);
NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers, Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 217-18 (1972);
infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text; see also Levin & Werhan, supra note 2, at 401-05
(discussing the Court's rejection of the contract theory in Booster Lodge and Granite
State).
17. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 186. The Court stated that permissible internal actions
were actions that applied to full union members and followed democratic principles and fair
procedures. Id. at 195. Impermissible external actions were actions that interfered with a
member's employment status, id., or interfered with the rights of nonmembers, id. at 189
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mitted the Court to enforce disciplinary fines."' Finally, the Court
declined to decide whether the union members' status as full members had any effect on their rights, because the parties did not present evidence that any of the fined employees were less than full
members.1 9 The Court, however, implied that the result might be
different if any of the employees had been less than full union
members.2 0
n.25; see Machinists Local 1327, IAM (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984, 988 (1982) (Van
de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring); see also Silard, Labor Board Regulation of Union Discipline After Allis-Chalmers, Marine Workers, and Scofield, 38 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 187, 190 (1969-70) (arguing that "[s]tatutory freedom in internal union regulation generally exempts union discipline from Board intrusion unless the member would be
required to violate rights of others that the statute protects); see generally Allis-Chalmers,
388 U.S. at 184-91 (containing the Court's complete discussion of relevant legislative
history).
18. 388 U.S. at 192-95. The Court, reasoning that the efficacy of a contract depends on
the parties' ability to enforce it, reaffirmed the contract theory of union-member relationship. Id. at 192.
19. The Court mentioned this issue because the Act mandates that "[m]embership as
a condition of employment [must be] whittled down to its financial core." NLRB v. General
Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) declare that an unfair
labor practice occurs if either an employer or a union causes an employee to lose his job
because he is not a union member, unless the employee is not a member because he has not
paid dues or initiation fees. These provisions expressly limit a union member's obligation
under a union-security agreement to a payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. Id. at
742; see also Independent Shoe Workers (The U.S. Shoe Corp.), 208 N.L.R.B. 411, 411
(1974). This financial obligation, however, does not include payment of fines, assessments, or
untimely back dues. A union would commit an unfair labor practice if it conditioned employment on the payment of these obligations. See Zipp, Rights and Responsibilities of
Parties to a Union-Security Agreement, 33 LAB. L.J. 203, 211 (1982).
The Board has held that a union committed an unfair labor practice when it failed to
inform employees of their option not to become full-fledged union members. See, e.g.,
United Stanford Employees, Local 680, 232 N.L.R.B. 326, 326 (1977), enforced, 601 F.2d 980
(9th Cir. 1979); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 322, 226 N.L.R.B. 80, 90 (1976). For a general discussion of union-security agreements and their relationship to the financial obligation of membership, see F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 239-52 (1977); Zipp, supra, at 211-13.
The question that the Allis-Chalmers Court left open-whether a financial core member could be subject to union discipline for matters other than failing to pay initiation fees
and dues-still is unresolved. See, e.g., Johannesen, supra note 2, at 273-74; Levin &
Werhan, supra note 2, at 410-11. Two commentators have suggested that an employee
whose only union obligation is to pay initiation fees and dues is not a union member subject
to union discipline. See Levin & Werhan, supra note 2, at 408-11. These commentators
argue that the Board in Marlin Rockwell Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 553 (1955), distinguished between full members and mere dues-paying members when it held that employees may resign
during the term of a union-security agreement and not be subject to union discipline if they
pay dues. Levin & Werhan, supra note 2, at 408-11. This view of membership, the commentators contend, should apply in strike situations; if financial core members do not wish to
participate in a strike, they should not be subject to union discipline for crossing the picket
line and returning to work if they continue to meet their financial obligations. Id.
20. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 196-97.
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In dissent, Justice Black criticized the majority's reliance on
the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A). He believed that the union's
right to prescribe membership rules did not include the right to
restrain a member from working and to fine him for exercising his
section 7 right to refuse to participate in a strike." The dissent
reasoned that regardless of whether fines were enforceable by expulsion from the union or by judicial action, the mere threat of
22
fines would absolutely restrain employees from strikebreaking.
Justice Black also attacked the majority's implication that judicial
enforcement of fines was an internal union matter that the proviso
protected.23 He noted that section 8(b)(2) prohibits a union from
attempting to enforce fines by persuading the employer either to
discharge the employee for nonpayment or to withhold the fines
from the employee's wages.2 4 To Justice Black, the union's reliance
on the courts to enforce a fine was "equally effective outside assis25
tance," not internal union discipline.
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority's reliance on contract theory to enforce the union's disciplinary fines.2 6 The dissent
termed the contract theory a fiction that courts had used in the
past "to justify judicial intervention in union affairs" to help employees, not unions. 2 According to Justice Black, the majority's
use of contract theory to bind employees was unsatisfactory, especially when the contract was "the involuntary product of a union
28
shop.
Although subsequent Board and court decisions have ap21. Id. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 203-04 (Black, J., dissenting). The dissent rejected the argument that a
member might ultimately prevail by showing that the fine was unreasonable or that he was
not a full member. Id. (Black, J., dissenting). Few members, the dissent asserted, would
have the financial resources or knowledge of labor law to take such action. Id. at 204 (Black,
J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 205-06 (Black, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 206 (Black, J., dissenting). Section 8(b)(2) reads in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization ...
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee . . . with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982); see also supra note 19.
25. 388 U.S. at 206 (Black, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 207-08 (Black, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 207 (Black, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 207-08 (Black, J., dissenting).
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proved Allis-Chalmers,29 much of the controversy surrounding the
authority of a union to restrict its members' right to resign continues to focus on the policy issues discussed at length in the majority
and dissenting opinions. In Scofield v. NLRB3 0 the Supreme Court
applied Allis-Chalmers to a union rule imposing fines on members
who violated union production ceilings.' The Court concluded
that the union rule did not violate section 8(b)(1)(A).3 2 According
to the Court, under section 8(b)(1) "a union may enforce a properly adopted rule that (1) reflects a legitimate union interest, (2)
does not impair congressional labor policy, and (3) reasonably applies against union members who are free to leave the union and
33
escape the rule.
Finding that the record did not indicate that the fines were
unreasonable or that union membership was involuntary, the
Court focused on the first two parts of its test.3 4 The Court first
determined that the union's production ceiling served a legitimate
union interest-limiting the negative impact of an unlimited piecework pay system. 5 The Court then analyzed the rule's effect on
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 215-16
(1972); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428-30 (1969); Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB, 725
F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1984) (Dalmo Victor II); Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 724
F.2d 57, 60 (7th Cir. 1983) (Rockford-Beloit); IAM, Local Lodge 1414 (Neufeld PorscheAudi), 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1257, 1258-59 (June 22, 1984); cf. Gould,
Some Limitations upon Union Discipline Under the National Labor Relations Act: The
Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1067 (analyzing the effect of Allis-Chalmers
and Scofield on national labor policy); Silard, supra note 17 (same); Note, Labor Policy:
Judicial Enforcement of Fines After Allis-Chalmers, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1094 (1968) (criticizing the Court's implicit authorization of the application of state law regarding fines as
eroding the uniformity of national labor policy); Recent Case, Suit to Enforce Union Fine
Against Member Who Crosses Picket Line Is Not Unfair Labor Practice Under Section
8(b)(l)(A)-NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 388 U.S. 175 (1967), 36 U.
CIN. L. REv. 709, 714 (1967) (criticizing decision because the "right to refrain from concerted
union activities is substantially diminished when the union is given the right to invoke the
full power of the court to implement measures which limit § 7 rights"); Recent Decision,
Supreme Court Rules Court Enforced Union Fines for Refusal to Participatein Lawful
Strike Do Not Constitute Unfair Labor Practice-NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), 19 SYRACUSE L. REv. 177 (1967) (predicting that the decision will
significantly enhance union solidarity and power).
30. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
31. Id. at 424-25, 428.
32. Id. at 436.
33. Id. at 430.
34. Id. at 430-31.
35. Unlimited piecework pay systems increase employee productivity and create pressures to lower the piecework pay rate. As a result, employees work harder, but earn little
more than before. Unions fear that resulting competitive pressures can "endanger workers'
health, foment jealousies, and reduce the work force." Id. at 431.
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federal labor policy and concluded that the rule did not contravene
any policy of the Act.3" The Board and courts have implemented
37
this three-part standard in many cases since Scofield.
Following Scofield the Court in NLRB v. Granite State Joint
Board, Textile Workers Union, Local 10298 specifically addressed
the validity of fines that a union imposed on members who resigned from the union during a strike and returned to work. The
Court held that absent a contractual provision in the union's constitution or bylaws restricting the member's right to resign, the
union's fines violated section 8(b)(1)(A).3 9 To reach this conclusion,
the Court relied heavily on Scofield for the proposition that a
union's power over a member ends when he lawfully resigns from
the organization.4 ° The majority distinguished Allis-Chalmers because the union in Allis-Chalmers had imposed fines on full union
members.4 1 Once a member "'leave[s] the union and escape[s] the
rule,' ",42 according to the Court, the union "has no more control
36. The petitioners contended that the production ceilings impaired collective bargaining, but the Court rejected this argument. Id. at 432-33. Similarly, the Court denied the
petitioners' claims of featherbedding. Id. at 434. Petitioners also asserted that the union rule
discriminated against union members who were not free to earn what the contract allowed
because the union imposed production ceilings. The Court, however, had little sympathy for
this argument, stating that "[ilf members are prevented from taking advantage of their contractual rights bargained for all employees it is because they have chosen to become and
remain union members." Id. at 435. If union members were dissatisfied with the union's
collective activity, the Court reasoned, they were free to leave the union. Id.
37. See NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1972);
Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212, 1216-18 (9th Cir. 1984) (Dalmo Victor II);
Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57, 60 (7th Cir. 1983) (Rockford-Beloit); IAM,
Local Lodge 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi), 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1257, 1258-59 (June 22, 1984); Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984,
988-89, 992 (1982).
38. 409 U.S. 213 (1972) (Gianite State).
39. Id. at 217-18. Subsequent Board decisions have interpreted this rule to permit resignation at will when no clause exists that provides for a member's voluntary resignation.
See, e.g., IBEW, Local 66 (Houston Lighting & Power Co.), 262 N.L.R.B. 483, 485-86 (1982);
United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local No. 725 (Boise Southern Co.), 220 N.L.R.B. 812,
813 (1975); Bookbinders Union Local 60, 203 N.L.R.B. 732, 735 (1973). A member must
express the desire to resign. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 262 N.L.R.B. at 486; Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 170, 225 N.L.R.B. 1178, 1180 (1976). Notice is effective
when the union receives it. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 243 N.L.R.B. 147,
148 (1979); cf. IBEW, Local 1260 (Western Telestations), 239 N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1978)
(member of union at another local who did nothing to maintain his union membership constructively resigned so that IBEW violated § 8(b)(1)(A) when it fined him for working during a strike).
40. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 215-17 (citing Scofield, 394 U.S. at 429-30).
41. 409 U.S. at 215.
42. Id. at 216 (quoting Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430).
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over the former member than it has over the man in the street. '43
In addition, the Court rejected the mutual subscription theory
on which the First Circuit had relied in upholding the union provision.44 Under this theory the First Circuit concluded that the
union did not violate section 8(b)(1)(A) because the employees
waived their section 7 right to refrain from collective activity when
they participated in the strike vote and the vote to authorize fines
against strikebreakers. 45 The Supreme Court ruled that the vitality
of section 7 requires that members retain the right "to refrain in
November from the actions [they] endorsed in May. '46 The Court
reasoned that employees should not have to sacrifice their section
7 rights to the "union's plea for solidarity or . . its pressures for
4' 7
conformity.
The Court addressed a related issue in Booster Lodge No. 405,
IAM v. NLRB.4 8 In Booster Lodge the Court held that a union
committed an unfair labor practice when it sought to enforce fines
that it imposed on employees who had resigned lawfully from the
union before crossing the picket line and returning to work. 49 As in
Granite State, the union constitution did not explicitly restrict the
43. 409 U.S. at 217. The Court based this holding on "the law which normally is reflected in our free institutions"-the right to resign from or join organizations as the individual sees fit. Id. at 216.
44. Id. at 217. The "mutual subscription" theory is similar to the "contract" theory,
discussed supra note 16. Under the "mutual subscription" theory, a union member who
participates in the strike vote is obligated to remain on strike until its conclusion because
his fellow members depended on him. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Dalmo Victor II, relying on
this theory, stated that "'[t]he strike vote itself involves mutual reliance on the promise to
honor it.'" Machinist Local 1237 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 1984) (Dalmo
Victor II) (quoting Note, Union Power to Discipline Members Who Resign, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 1536, 1554 (1973)).
45. 409 U.S. at 217.
46. Id. at 217-18.
47. Id. at 218.
48. 412 U.S. 84 (1973) (per curiam) (Booster Lodge). The Court decided Booster
Lodge the same term that it decided Granite State.
In another case during that term, NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973), the Court
held that the Board does not have the authority to determine whether the amount of a
union disciplinary fine is reasonable. Id. at 78. The Court believed that the issue of reasonableness would involve the Board in internal union affairs over which the NLRB does not
have jurisdiction. Id. at 74. In reaching this result the Court again applied the contract
theory of union membership and stated that state courts should determine the reasonableness of a union's fine based on contract law. Id. at 74-76; see Recent Development, NLRB
Has No Authority to Determine Reasonableness of Union Fines-NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412
U.S. 67 (1973), 62 GEO. L.J. 1033, 1033 (1974) (criticizing decision because it places an unjustifiable burden on individual union members who claim that a union fine is
unreasonable).
49. 412 U.S. at 85.
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right to resign.5 0 Unlike the union in Granite State, however, the
union in Booster Lodge argued that the prohibition against strikebreaking in the union's constitution was sufficient to make the
fines lawful against members who had resigned because the union
had interpreted the provision that way in the past." The Court
rejected this argument because the union failed to show that its
52
constitution extended union sanctions to nonmembers.
The Board rejected a similar argument in Local Lodge No.
1994, 1AM (O.K. Tool Co.).5" In O.K. Tool Co. the union's constitu54
tion specifically prohibited former members from strikebreaking.
The union enacted this provision to correct a defect that existed in
the union's constitution at the time of the Booster Lodge strike.55
The Board, however, ruled that the union's imposition of a courtcollectible fine on a former member for postresignation conduct
that the union's constitution expressly prohibited violated section
8(b)(1)(A) because section 7 protected the member's right to engage in this postresignation activity. 56 The Board explicitly declined to address the issue of the extent to which a contractual
restraint could curtail the freedom to resign, because neither the
union's constitution nor its bylaws contained a restriction on a
member's right to resign.57
The Board and the courts did not address the issue of a member's right to resign until the Board's decision in Machinists Local
1327 (Dalmo Victor 1)58 in 1977. In the period between the Supreme Court's decisions in Granite State and Booster Lodge and
the Board's decision in Dalmo Victor I, the Board carefully
avoided reaching this issue. Instead, the Board disposed of challenges to union clauses that restricted a member's right to resign
by developing a number of important corollaries. First, the Board
50. Id. at 88 (citing Granite State, 409 U.S. at 214).
51. 412 U.S. at 89.
52. Id.
53. 215 N.L.R.B. 651 (1974).
54. Id. at 652-53.
55. Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 89 n.9. In Booster Lodge the union's constitution contained only an express prohibition against strikebreaking. Id. at 89. The union argued that
this explicit prohibition implicitly applied to resigned members. Id.
56. The Board stated that "the Lodge's proscription of postresignation strikebreaking
[not only] impair[s] a former member's Section 7 right to refrain from concerted activity,
but it also is plainly contrary to Scofield's requirement that union members be free to leave
the union to escape membership conditions that they consider onerous." O.K. Tool Co., 215
N.L.R.B. at 653.
57. Id.; accord Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 88; Granite State, 409 U.S. at 217.
58. 231 N.L.R.B. 719 (1977), enforcement denied, 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979).
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ruled that the Act imposed a duty on unions to give notice to their
members of any constitutional restriction on a member's right to
resign.5 9 The Board held that a member's lack of knowledge of the
restrictive resignation provision rendered the clause invalid. The
employee thus retained the right to resign at will, and any union
attempt to fine the employee for crossing the picket line after he
had resigned violated section 8(b)(1)(A).6 0 Second, the Board permitted only reasonable restrictions on resignation. If the Board determined that a restriction was unreasonable, either because it was
unduly restrictive6 or ambiguous and vague, 62 the Board would
hold the provision unenforceable, and the member would be free to
59. See, e.g., NLRB v. IAM, Merrit Graham Lodge No. 1871, 575 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir.
1978) (per curiam), enforcing 231 N.L.R.B. 727 (1977); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union, Local 6-578, 238 N.L.R.B. 1227, 1230 (1978), enforced, 619 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1980);
General Teamsters Local 439 (Loomis Courier Serv., Inc.), 237 N.L.R.B. 220, 223 (1978);
United Stanford Employees, Local 680, 232 N.L.R.B. 326, 332 (1977), enforced, 601 F.2d 980
(9th Cir. 1979); Local 1384, UAW (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 227 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1048-49 (1977)
(Supplemental Order to 219 N.L.R.B. 729 (1975)); IAM, Local 778, 224 N.L.R.B. 580, 581
(1976). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or the Board in these cases found that the
employee had no knowledge or notice of the restrictive provision and, therefore, could not
consent to be bound by it.
One problem with this corollary is that it places a tremendous burden on the union to
ensure that every member is aware of any restrictions in the union constitution or bylaws.
The ALJ and, later, the Board, recognized this burden and attempted to ease it in Miscellaneous Drivers, Local Union No. 610 (Browning-Ferris Indus.), 264 N.L.R.B. 886 (1982). In
Browning-Ferristhe ALJ stated that the union's duty to communicate restrictions should
be limited "to situations where the members specifically ask for an explanation or where the
union has reason to suspect the development of actual problems involving the interpretation
of union rules." Id. at 901. In Browning-Ferristhe union neglected to fulfill its duty to
inform employees of the correct method of resignation because nonconforming resignation
letters that the union received indicated that employees wanted to resign. Id. at 901-02. In
this situation the ALJ held the resignations were effective unless the union took prompt
steps to inform its members about the restrictions on resignations. Id. at 901-02.
60. See Granite State, 409 U.S. at 217.
61. The Board has found union prohibitions against voluntary resignation unduly restrictive. See Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local No. 32B, 250 N.L.R.B. 850, 851 (1980); Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 170, 225 N.L.R.B. 1178, 1180 (1976). Similarly,
the Board has held unduly restrictive clauses prohibiting resignations during a strike. See
San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 243 N.L.R.B. 147, 148 (1979); Sheet Metal
Workers, Local Union No. 170, 225 N.L.R.B. at 1180; Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n,
Local Union No. 29, 222 N.L.R.B. 1156, 1159-60 (1976). In addition, the Board has deemed
unduly restrictive clauses that leave acceptance of a member's resignation to the discretion
of the local union. See San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,243 N.L.R.B. at 148;
Sheet Metal Workers, Local Union No. 170, 225 N.L.R.B. at 1180; Sheet Metal Workers,
Local Union No. 29, 222 N.L.R.B. at 1160. Finally, the Board has held unduly restrictive
clauses that allowed effective resignation only during certain escape periods of the year. See
San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 243 N.L.R.B. at 148-49 (annual 15-day revocation period or 15-day term before the contract expired was too restrictive); Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 6-578, 238 N.L.R.B. 1227, 1230 (1978), enforced, 619
F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1980) (provision in union constitution allowing resignation within 10-day
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resign at will. 3
In the decade following Granite State, the Board developed
and extended its interim rules in an effort to avoid facing the issue
that Granite State left unresolved. In Dalmo Victor 1164 and Pattern Makers' League (Rockford-Beloit),5 however, the Board
finally confronted the question and specifically ruled on the extent
to which a union's contract provision may restrict a member's right
to resign. In each case the union appealed the Board's decision.
The federal courts of appeals reached contrary conclusions regarding the union's power to restrict a member's right to resign. Part
III of this Recent Development reviews these two decisions and anperiod preceding each member's date of membership was too restrictive); Engineers Union
Local 444 (Sperry Rand Corp.), 235 N.L.R.B. 98, 103 (1978) (restricting resignation period
to last 10 days in year or last 10 days of existing contract was unacceptable).
In Local 1384, UAW (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 219 N.L.R.B. 729 (1975), the Board held overly
restrictive a clause limiting resignation to the last 10 days of the calendar year, followed by
a 60-day waiting period. Id. at 735-36. In a Supplemental Order to this case, 227 N.L.R.B.
1045 (1977), the Board held that a union's restriction must be "narrowly tailored to the
Union's legitimate needs" and reasonably accommodate the conflicting interests of the
union and the employee. Id. at 1051. Sperry Rand Corp. and Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers
Int'l Union, Local 6-578 utilized the Ex-Cell-O standard in determining that the escape
period was too restrictive. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 6-578, 238
N.L.R.B. at 1230; Sperry Rand, 235 N.L.R.B. at 103.
62. The Board has held unreasonably vague a restriction based on conduct unbecoming a union member. See IAM, Merrit Graham Lodge No. 1871, 231 N.L.R.B. 727, 728
(1977), enforced, 575 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam). In addition, the Board found
unreasonable an ambiguous provision that gave the local union power to withhold consent,
but set no standard for evaluating resignations. Coast Valleys Typographical Union Local
650 (The Daily Breeze, Div. of Copley Press, Inc.), 221 N.L.R.B. 1048, 1051 (1975).
The Board also has held that threatening to impose fines, General Teamsters Local
Union No. 298, 236 N.L.R.B. 428, 436 (1978); Local Union No. 1233, United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 231 N.L.R.B. 756, 761 (1977); Local Union 2131, IBEW, 217 N.L.R.B. 46, 47
(1975); Communications Workers, Local 1127 (New York Tel. Co.), 208 N.L.R.B. 258, 263
(1974), refusing to allow an employee to post material that criticized the union on a union
bulletin board, Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 883, 894-95 (D.C. Cir. 1981), instituting court
action against union members for filing a union decertification petition, Television Wis., Inc.
224 N.L.R.B. 722, 780 (1976), and imposing discipline in derogation of the collective bargaining agreement, Stationary Eng'r, Local 39 (The San Jose Hosp. and Health Center), 240
N.L.R.B. 1122, 1124 (1979), all constituted coercive union activity within the meaning of
§ 8(b)(1)(A).
63. The union must have made an attempt to enforce the provision by disciplining or
threatening to discipline the member. See Meat Cutters Union Local 81, 241 N.L.R.B. 821,
822 (1979) (dismissing the complaint because "no employee . . . is subject to any union
discipline under the bylaw provision here in question").
For a discussion of various restrictions on resignation, see Gould, supra note 2, at 87-91;
Levin & Werhan, supra note 2, at 413-26; Wellington, supra note 2, at 1041-45.
64. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982), enforcement
denied, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984).
65. 265 N.L.R.B. 1332 (1982), enforced, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983).
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other more recent Board decision, IAM, Local Lodge 1414,
(Neufeld Porsche-Audi),6 which addressed the tension between a
union's authority to restrict resignations and a member's right to
refrain from collective activity.
III.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Dalmo Victor

The Board's first decision in Dalmo Victor 7 closely paralleled
its earlier decision in O.K. Tool Co. 6 8 In both cases the provision at
issue prohibited strikebreaking by any member or resigned member of the union. 9 The majority in Dalmo Victor I held that rather
than imposing a restriction on the right to resign, this provision
impermissibly attempted to regulate postresignation conduct. 70
Once the Board invalidated the union's restriction on its members'
right to resign, the Board then ruled that members were free to
resign at will and that any fines which the union levied in response
to members' postresignation conduct would violate section
8(b)(1)(A).71
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order.72 The court believed that the
66. 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1257 (June 22, 1984).
67. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor I), 231 N.L.R.B. 719 (1977).
68. Local Lodge No. 1994 (O.K. Tool Co.), IAM, 215 N.L.R.B. 651 (1974). For a discussion of O.K. Tool Co., see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
69. In Dalmo Victor I the union provision stated:
Improper Conduct of a Member ... Accepting employment in any capacity in an establishment where a strike or lockout exists as recognized under this Constitution,
without permission. Resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to refrain
from accepting employment at the establishment for the duration of the strike or lockout within 14 days preceding its commencement. Where observance of a primary picket
line is required, resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to observe the
primary picket line for its duration if the resignation occurs during the period that the
picket line is maintained or within 14 days preceding its establishment.
Dalmo Victor I, 231 N.L.R.B. at 719 (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 720-21; see supra note 56 and accompanying text. The Board reached this
issue because the Board found that the employees were aware of the provision at all times,
and the union warned the employees that they would be fined for crossing the picket line
during the strike. Dalmo Victor I, 231 N.L.R.B. at 719-20.
71. Dalmo Victor 1, 231 N.L.R.B. at 722. The dissent strongly criticized the majority
for sidestepping the legal issue that Granite State had left unanswered. Id. at 723 & n.16
(Jenkins, Member, dissenting). Labelling the majority's holding a "flagrant exercise in semantic double-think," the dissent would have found the provision a clear restriction on the
right to resign. Id. at 724 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting). Members Jenkins and Murphy,
who dissented separately, both viewed the restriction as a reasonable exercise of the union's
right to regulate its internal affairs under the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 723, 725.
72. NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327, 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979) (Dalmo Victor I).
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provision plainly limited the circumstances under which a member
could resign, and the court termed the Board's holding
"hypertechnical." 73 Seeking to bolster its construction of the provision, the court indicated that the union's asserted purpose was to
impose "'contractual restrictions on a member's right to resign.' "74 The court concluded that because the provision restricted
resignation, the case presented the same issue that the Supreme
Court reserved in Granite State and Booster Lodge.7 5 Accordingly,
the court 6remanded the case to the Board for consideration of that
71
question.
On remand in Dalmo Victor 1 7 the plurality 8 attempted to
strike a balance between an employee's right to refrain from collective activity and a union's need to protect the collective interests
of the employees that it represents.7 The plurality maintained
that neither interest was absolute, but held that a union could impose reasonable restrictions on member resignations when necessary for the orderly management of union affairs.8 The plurality,
however, found that a provision limiting a member's right to resign
exclusively to nonstrike periods was unreasonable. 8 ' The provision
must apply equally to strike and nonstrike periods, the plurality
declared. 2
73. Id. at 1222.
74. Id. (quoting Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 88 (1973) (per
curiam)).
75. Id.
76. Id. The dissent stated that the court should have invalidated the provision either
because it controlled postresignation conduct, id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting), or because it
was not a direct and unambiguous restriction on the right to resign. Id. at 1223 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting); see supra note 62 (discussing the validity of a vague constitutional
provision).
77. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982).
78. Members Fanning and Zimmerman wrote the Board's plurality opinion. Chairman
Van de Water and Member Hunter concurred only in the result. Id. at 987.
79. Id. at 985.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 986-87.
82. Id. The plurality felt that a union provision requiring a 30-day waiting period (the
"30-day rule") before resignation took effect reasonably would accommodate the conflicting
interests of the union and its individual members. Id. at 987. This restriction would serve
two union interests: first, the union would maintain solidarity during a strike, and second,
the union would be able to handle any administrative matters that might arise before the
resignation would become effective. Id. Commentators have recognized the union's administrative interest. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 2, at 90. Gould also advocated the adoption of a
30-day "grace period." Gould, supra note 29, at 1103. In a footnote, the plurality stated that
in extraordinary circumstances a union might need more than 30 days to dispose of administrative matters. Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. at 987 n.21; see Comment, supra note 2
(favoring the 30-day rule).
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The two members of the Board who concurred in the plurality
opinion agreed that the provision unreasonably restricted the right
to resign and that the union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by fining
members who had resigned."' The concurring members, however,
disagreed with the plurality's contention that in certain circumstances a union could impose restrictions on its members' right to
resign. The concurrence would have held that any restriction was
84
unreasonable.
83. Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. at 987 (Van de Water, Chairman, and "Hunter,
Member, concurring).
84. Id. at 988 (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring); accord W.
CONNOLLY, JR. & M. CONNOLLY, supra note 2, at 209-10; Johannesen, supra note 2, at 278.
The concurrence regarded the 30-day rule as an "arbitrary exercise of this Board's authority" that represented a "transparent effort to achieve a legislative result rather than a reasoned legal conclusion." 263 N.L.R.B. at 987 (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring).
The concurring members argued that Supreme Court precedent prohibited any restriction on resignation. According to the concurrence, the Supreme Court consistently has focused on the internal-external dichotomy of union affairs. Id. at 988-89 (Van de Water,
Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring); see Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 89; Granite
State, 409 U.S. at 215-16; Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 184-95. Internal actions designed to
achieve a legitimate union interest and applied to full union members are permissible, while
external actions designed to interfere with an employee's employment status or with the
rights of nonmembers violate the Act. Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. at 988-90 (Van de
Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring). The concurring members contended
that the Court emphasized this distinction in Granite State when the Court held that a
union violated § 8(b)(1)(A) in seeking to enforce a union rule against strikebreaking in an
external matter. Id. at 989 (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring).
The concurring members relied on GraniteState because they felt that the 30-day rule
was inconsistent with the Court's reasoning in that case. Id. (Van de Water, Chairman, and
Hunter, Member, concurring). First, the concurrence placed importance on the Court's
statement that the power of the union over a member ends when the member dissolves the
union-member relationship by resigning. Id. (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring). Second, the concurrence found significant the Court's rejection of the mutual subscription theory. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. The concurrence
relied on Scofield for the proposition that a union member must be free to leave the union
and avoid the union's rules if he chooses. Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. at 989-90 (Van de
Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring).
The concurring opinion then attacked the majority's premise that the 30-day rule would
successfully balance the conflict between an employee's § 7 rights and a union's interest in
solidarity. Pointing out that a union's institutional interests are not and never have been on
equal footing with the employees' § 7 rights, id. at 990-91 (Van de Water, Chairman, and
Hunter, Member, concurring); accord Johannesen, supra note 2, at 275, the concurring
members criticized the balancing that the majority engaged in to arrive at the 30-day rule as
improper legislating under the Act, Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. at 991 (Van de Water,
Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring).
The concurrence also accused the majority of altering the dichotomy between external
and internal affairs under § 8(b)(1)(A). The majority had created a fiction of continued
membership in which an employee had to remain a union member and, therefore, subject to
internal union discipline, for 30 days against his will. Id. at 991 (Van de Water, Chairman,
and Hunter, Member, concurring). The concurrence caustically inquired whether the major-
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The Ninth Circuit again refused to enforce the Board's order. 5 Federal labor policy, according to the court, restricts the individual's bargaining freedom and vests in a single representative
the power to bargain for and protect the interests of all employees.8 6 Noting that a collective representative inevitably will create
ity would diminish other rights that the Act guaranteed if the majority felt that those rights
also conflicted with a union's or an employer's legitimate interests. Id. at 991 (Van de
Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring).
Finally, the concurring members discussed the Scofield test and stated that the majority's purported analysis confused and distorted the proper approach under this test. Id. at
992 (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring). The concurrence conceded that the union's legitimate interest in maintaining strike solidarity satisfied the first
part of the Scofield test. Id. at 992 (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring). The concurrence, however, felt that the 30-day rule did not pass the second part of
the test, because the rule ran counter to three policies of the Act: (1) the right of employees
to refrain from collective activity; (2) the policy limiting the coercive authority of unions
wholly to internal affairs; and (3) the policy behind § 8(b)(2) and the proviso to § 8(b)(3)
that allows a union to compel only core membership. Id. (Van de Water, Chairman, and
Hunter, Member, concurring). For a discussion of this third policy, see supra note 19. The
concurrence argued that the only way the majority could uphold any restriction on the right
to resign, including the 30-day rule, would be to allow a union's interest to override the
basic policies of the Act. According to the concurring members, this alternative was impossible because the standard that the Supreme Court applied in Scofield separated union interest and labor policy into two distinct questions, of which legitimate union interest was
merely a threshold issue. Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. at 992 (Van de Water, Chairman,
and Hunter, Member, concurring). Failing to separate these tests "renders the three-part
test redundant and virtually useless." Id. (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member,
concurring).
Moreover, the concurrence stated, the 30-day rule certainly did not satisfy the third
part of the Scofield test because the rule would not be a rule "reasonably enforced against
union members who are free to leave the union and avoid the rule." Id. (emphasis added)
(Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring). The concurrence felt that the
third part of the Scofield test was the most important because it embodies an essential
protection of employee § 7 rights, while limiting the power of the union. Id. (Van de Water,
Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring). Abrogating this protection would negate Congress' objective in passing the Act. Id. (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member,
concurring).
In conclusion, the concurring members offered their own resolution of the issue: "[a]ny
union rule that restricts a member's right to resign is unreasonable and any discipline taken
by a union against an employee predicated on such a rule violates Section 8(b)(1)(A)." Id.
(Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member concurring). Moreover, the concurrence
would not allow the union to condition a resignation upon the payment of monies owed. Id.
at 993 (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring). The concurrence reasoned that the union could recoup its losses through legal proceedings. Id. (Van de Water,
Chairman, and Hunter, Member, concurring). In addition, the resignation must be delivered
in writing to be effective. Id. at 992-93 (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member
concurring).
The dissent would have found the union rule reasonable and protected by the proviso
to § 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 993 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
85. Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984) (Dalmo Victor II).
86. Id. at 1216.
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some dissatisfaction among the employees that he represents, the
Ninth Circuit stated that courts should allow "'[a] wide range of
reasonableness'" when evaluating the actions of the bargaining
representative.8 7 The Ninth Circuit selected the Scofield test as
the proper standard for determining the reasonableness of a union
disciplinary rule. The court further held that a reasonable disciplinary rule must satisfy all three parts of the Scofield test.8 8 In quoting the test, however, the court failed to include the words "who
are free to leave the union and escape the rule," which are critical
to the third part of the standard. 9
Applying Scofield to the union rule in question, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the rule satisfied all three parts of the test."
The court held that the rule met the first requirement because the
union had a legitimate interest in restricting its members' right to
resign during a strike to maintain solidarity in the face of employer
demands. 1 The court reasoned that unpunished postresignation
strikebreaking could induce even loyal union members to return to
work and thereby seriously undermine the union's ability to function as an effective collective bargaining unit.92 The court also
found a union interest under the mutial subscription theory93 by
noting that union members who participate in a strike vote and
refuse to honor its outcome breach a promise to their colleagues. 4
87. Id. at 1216 (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 180) (emphasis added by Ninth
Circuit).
88. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1216-17 (citing Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430).
89. The Scofield test provides that "[§] 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has
imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who arefree
to leave the union and escape the rule." Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430 (emphasis added); see
infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text. In employing this test, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Board's suggestion that the Scofield analysis was a balancing of interests. According to the Court, Scofield does not invite the Board or the courts "to conduct an ad hoc
weighing of the allegedly competing interests described in the main text of § 8(b)(1)(A) on
the one hand, and the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) on the 'other." Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at
1217.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The court based its concern for the union's maximum bargaining effectiveness
on the desire to maintain the prevailing balance of power between the union and the employer. The court feared that "a substantial number of defections ... [would] once again
give the employer greater power to set the terms and conditions of employment." Id.
93. Id. The First Circuit used the mutual subscription theory in Granite State. See
supra text accompanying note 45. The Supreme Court specifically rejected the theory when
it reviewed the case. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
94. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1217 ("There is little point in taking a strike vote if
the people who disagree with the outcome are free to resign anytime and escape its
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The court next focused on the second prong of the Scofield
test and held that the union fine created an obstacle to members'
resignations but did not impair federal labor policy.95 The court
first rejected the Board's finding that a conflict existed between
the union member's right to resign and the union's interest in
making rules regarding the acquisition and retention of membership. Noting that both the employee's right and a union's interest
are important federal labor policies, the court concluded that
neither policy could override the other."6 Accordingly, a union rule
that does not prevent a member from resigning during a strike, but
merely "puts some obstacles [such as fines] in the way of resignation," does not impair federal labor policy under section 7.97 The
court believed that union members who are unwilling to face the
threatened penalty have several options: (1) attempt to persuade
other employees and the union leaders to end the strike; (2) resign
from the union and get new jobs; (3) elect new union leaders who
share their views; or (4) petition the Board to decertify the bargaining representative.9 8 The court, however, emphasized that the
union members "may not betray their colleagues and expect to get
away without paying a price for weakening the collective bargaining environment." 99
Finally, under the third part of the Scofield test, the Dalmo
Victor II court rejected the Board's contention that the union rule
was unreasonable because it prohibited resignations during a period beginning two weeks before the commencement of a strike
and ending at the strike's termination. 10 0 To the court this rule was
not only reasonable, but critical. 1 1 The court emphasized that the
mere appearance of uncertain membership support would encourage the employer to negotiate a harder bargain. 02 The court
also believed that the fine was reasonable because the union had
no other effective means of discouraging employees from working
effects.").
95. Id. at 1217-18.
96. Id. at 1217.
97. Id. The court interpreted § 7 to allow a union member to resign from the union at
any time. Id.
98. Id. at 1218.
99. Id.
100. Id. In applying the third part of the Scofield test, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the requirement that the union member must be free to leave the union and escape
the rule. See supra text accompanying note 33; infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
101. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1218.
102. Id.
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for the employer during a strike.' Having decided that the union
rule fining strikebreakers met all three requirements of the
Scofield test, the court held that the rule was a reasonable restriction on an employee's right to resign from the union. 04 The court
thus refused to enforce the Board's order.
B.

Rockford-Beloit

The Board decided Pattern Makers' League (Rockford-Beloit)'0 5 shortly after it decided Dalmo Victor II. The challenged
provision in Rockford-Beloit prevented members from resigning
from the union during a strike or lockout or during a period in
which a strike or lockout was imminent.'0 6 The Board held that
because this provision was substantially similar to the invalidated
07
provision in Dalmo Victor II, Dalmo Victor II was controlling.'
The Board concluded that it should not enforce the provision because it prohibited resignations once a strike had begun.' 08
In Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB' 09 the Seventh Circuit
enforced the Board's order. The union argued that the proviso to
section 8(b)(1)(A)"10 protected the union's restriction on its members' right to resign."' The court, however, rejected this argument
and focused on the external-internal dichotomy in Supreme Court
precedent." 2 Citing Scofield, the Seventh Circuit implied that a
union rule that "'invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the
labor laws'" affects the external activities of a union member, and
thus violates section 8(b)(1)(A) because the rule does not fit within
the proviso to that section."13 The court relied on language in
Granite State and Booster Lodge for the proposition that fines
103. Id. As a disciplinary measure, threatening to expel a member who already wants
to resign should have no effect on his decision to return to work because he already is prepared to resign. Id.
104. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1218.
105. 265 N.L.R.B. 1332 (1982), enforced, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983).
106. 265 N.L.R.B. at 1332.
107. Id. at 1333.
108. Id. Despite the Dalmo Victor II dicta regarding a 30-day rule, the case held that
the Board could not prohibit the union from restricting resignations during a strike. See
supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
109. 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983) (Rockford-Beloit).
110. See supra note 5 (text of proviso).
111. Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d at 59.
112. Id. at 59-60; see, e.g., Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 89; Granite State, 409 U.S. at
215; Scofield, 394 U.S. at 428-29; Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 184-95; see also supra notes
17-20 and accompanying text.
113. Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d at 59 (quoting Scofield, 394 U.S. at 429).
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which the union levied against resigned members frustrate the individual's "overriding right" to join or to resign from the
114
organization.
Although the court acknowledged that the unions in Granite
State and Booster Lodge did not restrict resignations, the court
reasoned that the Supreme Court's analysis in Granite State and
Booster Lodge applied in Rockford-Beloit because the Act protects
the employee's section 7 right to refrain from union activities,
which includes the right to resign from the union." 5 According to
the court, a union rule that abrogates an employee's right to resign
frustrates an "overriding policy of labor law"-allowing employees
the freedom to choose whether to engage in the collective bargaining process." 6 Because the right to resign is part of an essential
policy concern, even strong union interests in solidarity and mutual reliance cannot supersede this employee right. 117 The court
also found that the employee has strong interests, in addition to
his section 7 rights, in preserving the right to resign from the
union. These interests include the employee's freedom to change
his mind about the effectiveness of a strike and his desire to return
to work for personal reasons." 8 Returning to the external-internal
distinction, the court noted that although a union has the power to
control its internal affairs through rules reflecting the will of the
majority of its members, the union cannot exercise that power to
prevent an employee from resigning his membership or to penalize
an employee who resigns from the union." 9
In conclusion, the Rockford-Beloit court stressed the concept
114. Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d at 59-60 (quoting Granite State, 409 U.S. at 216); accord Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 89-90.
115. Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d at 60.
116. Id.
117. Id. The court indicated that "forced continued membership distorts the balance
between encouraging collective activities among workers and protecting individuals from coercion." Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. According to the court, "[a]n employee's decision to resign is personal; a
union rule requiring retention of membership cannot be considered merely an 'internal matter.'" Id.
The union made a second argument in favor of restricting resignation. The union used
the mutual reliance theory to argue that the union members waived their § 7 right to resign
from the union when they voted to strike. Id. at 60-61. Because each member joined the
union or retained union membership with full knowledge that the union prohibited resignations during strikes or lockouts, the union argued that the union-employee relationship is
voluntary and enforceable. Id. at 61. The court, however, in rejecting this argument, cited
the Supreme Court's rejection of the same argument in Granite State. The court emphasized that "[tlhe Supreme Court decided that the employees' interests took precedence." Id.
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in Scofield that union members are free to leave the union and
escape an undesired rule.120 This fundamental principle, the court
felt, "safeguards the balance between individual rights and the collective power of the union."' 21 Holding that this principle directly
applied to the facts in this case, the court enforced the Board's
order.122
C. Neufeld Porsche-Audi
Recently, in 1AM, Local Lodge 1414123 (Neufeld PorscheAudi) the Board held that a union restriction on an employee's
right to resign violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. In Neufeld
Porsche-Audi the union imposed a court-collectible fine on an employee who returned to work during a strike after he had submitted a written resignation to the union.124 The Board, relying pri25
marily on the concurrence in Dalmo Victor II,1
expressly

overruled Dalmo26 Victor 11 and invalidated the union's restriction
on resignations.1

To establish an analytical framework for deciding whether a
union can restrict its members' right to resign, the Board first discussed relevant Supreme Court precedent.

27

Initially, the Board

28

focused on the Scofield test. The majority acknowledged that a
resignation restriction advances strike solidarity, a legitimate
union interest, but also substantially impairs fundamental labor
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1257 (June 22, 1984).
124. 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1257-58. The union's constitution
held ineffective any resignations that occurred during a strike or lockout. Id. No. 209, 116
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1257.
125. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
126. 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1258.
127. Id. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1258-59. The Board analyzed the Court's
decisions in Allis-Chalmers, Scofield, GraniteState, and Booster Lodge. In discussing AllisChalmers, the Board noted the Supreme Court's emphasis on the internal-external dichotomy inherent in the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A). Id. According to the Board, Scofield reinforced
the Allis-Chalmers distinction between external and internal rules and developed a test for
determining whether enforcement of a union rule is lawful. Id. The Board read Granite
State as applying the Scofield test in holding that the union had violated § 8(b)(1)(A). Id.
No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1259. In reviewing Granite State, the Board emphasized
the Court's ruling that union discipline is lawful only if a union member is free to resign
from the union and refrain from concerted activities. Id. The Board also noted that Granite
State and Booster Lodge rejected the union's asserted interest in union solidarity and the
mutual reliance of its members. Id.
128. Id. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1259-61; see supra text accompanying note
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law policies. 129 The Board ruled that the restriction impaired the
employee's section 7 right to refrain from concerted activities,
which includes "not only the right to refrain from strikes, but also
the right to resign union membership."' 130 In addition, restricting a
member's right to resign creates the fiction of continued membership and undermines the policy of the Act against compelling full
union membership.'
The Board also concluded that the restriction on resignations
impaired the policy distinction between internal and external
union actions. 3 2 The Board reasoned that "[a] consistent and enduring basis for distinguishing between internal and external actions is whether the union's action applies only to union members."' 3 A union's unilateral extension of an employee's
membership obligation through restrictions on resignation artificially expands the definition of internal action and allows the
union to continue to regulate conduct over which it would otherwise have no control. 34 The union attempted to justify its rule by
arguing that the'rule "seeks to preserve strike solidarity and pro35
tect the rights of employees who choose to continue a strike."'
The Board, however, noted that the Supreme Court expressly rejected this contention in Granite State and Booster Lodge. 36 Rely37
ing on this precedent, the Board rejected the union's argument.1
The Board also agreed with the Dalmo Victor 11 concurring member's assertion that the institutional interests of a union cannot
override an employee's section 7 rights. 38 In addition, the Board
pointed out that a fundamental conflict exists between employees
who wish to refrain from strike activities and employees who wish
129. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1259-60.
130. Id. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260. The Board did not have any authority
for this assertion. The right to refrain from strikes is not absolute; a member remains subject to the union's internal disciplinary power if he returns to work without first resigning
from the union. See Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 196-97.
131. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260; see
Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 196-97.
132. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260-61.
133. Id. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260.
134. Id. The Board distinguished between an "internal union rule that carries incidental external effects" and a rule restricting resignations. The rule restricting resignations
"constitutes a unilateral reordering of the basic employee-union relationship that directly
and fundamentally redraws the line between internal and external actions." Id. No. 209, 116
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260 n.16.
135. Id. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1261.
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to participate in the walkout. The Board, however, concluded that
it could not compromise the neutrality of the Act by sanctioning a
union's efforts to restrict resignations when the union rule favors
striking employees at the expense of employees who choose not to
strike. 3
Focusing on the third prong of the Scofield test, the Board
held that the union rule violates the principle that employees must
be free to leave the union and escape the rule, because the rule
"tells employees they cannot, in fact, escape the rule.' 140 The
Board then considered the Seventh Circuit's opinion in RockfordBeloit and the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Dalmo Victor II. Although Neufeld Porsche-Audi arose in the Ninth Circuit, the
Board declined to follow Dalmo Victor II because the Board found
the Seventh Circuit's opinion more persuasive."
The dissent agreed with the majority that the rule against resignations was unreasonable, but believed that the majority should
not have overruled the plurality in Dalmo Victor I, 42 According
to the dissent, the majority misread Supreme Court precedent in
holding that the individual's section 7 rights are absolute. 4 3 Criticizing the majority's failure to balance the competing interests of
the union and the individual in light of the overall scheme of the
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. The Board criticized the Ninth Circuit's approach for several reasons. First,
the Board did not accept the mutual subscription theory. Id.; see supra notes 16 & 44-47
and accompanying text. Second, the Board rejected the Ninth Circuit's argument that an
employee's wishes are subservient to the will of the majority of the union because the union
represents the entire unit of employees. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1261-62. Although the Board conceded that the employee's wishes are
less important than the majority's with respect to employee relations with management, the
Board stated emphatically that the union cannot "unilaterally order an employee's membership relations with the union." Id. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1262.
Third, the Board rejected the Ninth Circuit's view that the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) gives
unions the right to impose indefinite temporal restrictions on an employee's right to resign
and return to work during a strike. Id. The Board stated that allowing the union to impose
such restrictions would authorize a union to "unilaterally ... shift the line of demarcation
between internal and external actions." Id.
Fourth, the Board disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's contention that the union's interests in preserving solidarity and the employee's § 7 rights are coexistent. Id. The Board
reiterated its position that institutional interests never can negate express statutory rights.
Id. Last, the Board criticized the court for omitting the final portion of the Scofield testthat a union member is free to leave the union and escape its rule. Id.
142. Id. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1263 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
143. Id. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1263-64 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting);
see supra notes 39-43 & 51-52 and accompanying text.
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Act,'
the dissent advocated reaffirming the plurality dicta in
Dalmo Victor II that a limited, temporal restriction on resigna1 45
tions is reasonable.
IV.

THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD

In deciding to hear an appeal from the Seventh Circuit decision in Rockford-Beloit, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to
clear up this troubled area of labor law. If the Court rules narrowly
in this case, it can avoid deciding whether a union may impose any
restrictions on resignations. Labor law practitioners, the Board,
and the circuit courts, however, would benefit much more if the
Court resolved this major conflict. This Recent Development argues that the Supreme Court should reject the Ninth Circuit's approach in Dalmo Victor II and affirm the Seventh Circuit's decision in Rockford-Beloit that any restriction on resignations
constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A).
The Supreme Court may rely on ample precedent to analyze
the issue of whether a union may impose restrictions on a union
member's ability to resign from the union. The proviso to section
8(b)(1)(A) protects a union's interest in regulating its internal affairs, 4' but does not permit a union to regulate external matters. 4 7
Thus, in Allis-Chalmers the Court held that a union could fine a
union member who returned to work during a strike, a violation of
the union constitution, because the union's efforts to enforce the
fine regulated only internal union affairs. 4 8 In Scofield the Court
approved the Allis-Chalmers Court's distinction between internal
and external enforcement of union rules and articulated a test to
49
determine whether a union rule violates section 8(b)(1)(A).1
In Granite State the Court applied the Scofield test to a fact
situation markedly similar to the fact situations in Dalmo Victor II
144. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1265 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
145. Id. (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting); see supra notes 77-82 and accompanying
text.
146. See Scofield, 394 U.S. at 428 (1969); Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 178 (1967).
147. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 217. For a discussion of the distinction between internal and external affairs, see supra note 17.
148. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 195, 197.
149. Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430. The Court did not state clearly whether it meant to
distinguish between internal and external rules, or between rules that violate federal labor
law and rules that do not violate federal law. The Court, however, has used the Scofield test
to determine whether a union rule violates federal labor law. See, e.g., Granite State, 409
U.S. at 216.
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and Rockford-Beloit. The union in Granite State fined an employee who resigned from the union and returned to work in violation of a union provision prohibiting strikebreaking. 15 ° Unlike the
cases on appeal, however, the union in Granite State did not restrict a union member's right to resign. The Court held that absent
a contractual restriction on a member's right to resign, he may resign at will. 151 Focusing on the second and third prongs of the
Scofield test, the Court ruled that a fine imposed on an employee
who lawfully resigns from the union and returns to work during a
strike impermissibly regulates external conduct and infringes 1on
52
the employee's section 7 right to refrain from collective activity.
Dalmo Victor 11 and Rockford-Beloit present the Supreme
Court with the question that GraniteState left unanswered: does a
union provision restricting member resignations permissibly regulate internal union affairs or does it impermissibly regulate external affairs and constitute an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(1)(A)? Since 1969 the Court has reviewed union rules in light
of the three-part Scofield test to determine whether the rule violates section 8(b)(1)(A) by impermissibly regulating external affairs. The Scofield test remains the proper analytical tool for evaluating these questions. If the union rule restricting resignations
fails to satisfy any of the three parts of the test, the Court should
hold that the rule violates section 8(b)(1)(A). This Recent Development contends that while a union rule restricting resignations
may pass the first part of the Scofield test, the rule definitely fails
the second and third parts of the test.
A.

A Union Rule Must Reflect a Legitimate Union Interest

A union has at least two legitimate interests in limiting its
members' right to resign. First, a union has an interest in protecting its solidarity because "[t]he economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving
agreement upon its terms . . . .,,5 In Dalmo Victor II the Ninth
150. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 216-17.
151. Id. at 217. The Court explicitly declined to decide to "what extent the contractual relationship between union and member may curtail the freedom to resign." Id.
152. Id. at 217-18. In Booster Lodge, the fourth Supreme Court decision in this area,
the Court reaffirmed its holding in Granite State and rejected the union's argument that
the Court consistently has read into a provision prohibiting strikebreaking a restriction on
the right to resign during a strike. Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 89. The Court refused to
extend the union sanctions to nonmembers. Id.
153. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 181.
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Circuit acknowledged that postresignation strikebreaking seriously
threatens a union's viability.15 4 As members increasingly resign and
escape obligations to their colleagues, loyal union members will
feel increasing pressure to resign as well. 1 55 A substantial number
of defections could break the union and shift negotiating power to
the employer, who then could dictate less favorable employment
terms. 15 The Seventh Circuit also recognized this legitimate union
interest in Rockford-Beloit.5 7
The Ninth Circuit identified a second legitimate union interest
in restricting its members' right to resign-the mutual reliance between union members who participated in the strike vote. 15 8 Noting that the strike vote is pointless if union members who disagree
with the outcome can escape the effects of the vote by resigning,
the Ninth Circuit stated that employees who vote to strike and
later change their minds "may not betray their colleagues and expect to get away without paying a price for weakening the collective bargaining environment.' ' 59 The Ninth Circuit, however,
failed to acknowledge that the Supreme Court expressly rejected
the mutual reliance theory in Granite State.6 0 Even if a union rule
restricting resignations satisfies the first part of the Scofield test
because the rule serves a legitimate union interest, it certainly fails
the second and third parts of the test.
B.

A Union Rule Must Not Impair CongressionalLabor Policy
1.

The Employee's Choice to Engage in Concerted Activity

In defining the second part of the Scofield test, the Court
stated that "if the rule invades or frustrates an overriding policy of
the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating [section] 8(b)(1). ' '161 The different results
that the Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit reached in RockfordBeloit and Dalmo Victor II stemmed partly from the two circuits'
contrasting views of when a rule frustrates an overriding policy of
154. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1217.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d at 60.
158. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1217; see also Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d at 60 (acknowledging the mutual reliance between union members).
159. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1218.
160. 409 U.S. at 217-18; see supra text accompanying notes 44-47. In Granite State
the Court did not indicate the outcome if a union contractually had imposed a restriction on
its members. 409 U.S. at 217.
161. 394 U.S. at 429.
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the labor laws. In Rockford-Beloit the Seventh Circuit recognized
that a rule restricting resignations frustrates the overriding policy
in section 7 that employees remain free to choose whether to engage in concerted activities.'62 In Dalmo Victor II, however, the
Ninth Circuit held that a restriction on resignations merely placed
"obstacles in the way of resignation, and did not 'override' any policy embedded in the labor laws."' 3
As the Seventh Circuit noted, restricting resignation impairs
the section 7 goal of protecting an employee's right to refrain from
collective activities.16 4 The legislative history of sections 7 and
8(b)(1)(A) indicates that Congress enacted these provisions to prevent unions from intimidating and coercing employees during
union organizational campaigns and to establish the employee's
right to refrain from union activities.'6 5 This interpretation of the
Act's legislative history by no means precludes the inference that
section 8(b)(1)(A) forbids other coercive activity as well. 6 In fact,
Senator Taft stated that the Wagner Act contains "express language in section 7 which would make the prohibition in section
8(b)(1) apply to coercive acts of unions against employees who did
not wish to join or did not care to participate in a strike or picket
line."'16 7 Through section 7 Congress gave employees the right to

refrain from concerted activity.'6 8 Accordingly, preventing an employee from resigning during a strike clearly frustrates labor policy
by preventing him from exercising his right to refrain from con162. 724 F.2d at 60. The Seventh Circuit stated that "[tihe Section 7 right to refrain
from union activities encompasses the right of members to resign from the union." Id.
163. 725 F.2d at 1217.
164. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) ("[e]mployees shall have the right. . . to refrain from
any or all [concerted] . . . activities.
... ).
165. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REc. 4142 (1947), reprintedin 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1025 (1948) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

166. See 93 CONG. REC. 4558 (1947), reprintedin 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
165, at 1199. Senator Ball, a cosponsor of the amendment that added §§ 7 and 8(b)(1)(A),
stated:
In my experience-and I know many employers and union leaders-they are very much

the same kind of people. In fact, they are like all the rest of us. Give either one of them
too much power and they tend to be corrupted; they begin to like the exercise of power
just for the sake of power. Union leaders very often tend to think a great deal more of
the strength and the funds of the union which pays their salaries than they do of the
welfare of the employees whom they are supposed to serve.
Id.
167. 93 CONG. REc. 7001, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 165, at 1623.
168. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
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certed activity. 16 9
The Supreme Court held in Scofield, Granite State, and
Booster Lodge that a union's power over a member ends with the
member's resignation.17 0 The proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A), which
gives the union the right to control its internal affairs, does not
authorize the union to discipline a member who resigns because
that member no longer participates in the union's internal affairs.
Unions have argued that because the member's resignation does
not take effect until after a strike or lockout ends, the union does
not control postresignation conduct, but only governs internal affairs. " ' This distinction, however, is meaningless; the effect is the
same because the rule gives the union control over the employee
for the duration of the strike, even after he clearly has expressed
the desire to sever his connection with the union and engage in his
section 7 right to refrain from collective activity.
In Dalmo Victor 11 the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Supreme Court's and the Seventh Circuit's logic. The Ninth Circuit
asserted that both the union's interest in governing its internal affairs and the employee's right to refrain from collective activities
are important federal labor policies.12 The court, therefore, believed that neither policy could override or impair the other within
the meaning of Scofield.17 3 According to the court, "Scofield does
not invite . . . [the] ad hoc weighing of the allegedly competing
interests described in the main text of [section] 8(b)(1)(A) . . .and
the proviso to [section] 8(b)(1)(A) . ..".
,1- The Dalmo Victor II
169. See Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d 57, 61 (7th Cir. 1983); Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270
N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260. The Board, in Neufeld Porsche-Audi, endorsed the Seventh Circuit position. The Board stated:
By unilaterally extending an employee's membership obligation through restrictions on
resignation a union artificially expands the definition of internal action and can thus
continue to regulate conduct over which it would otherwise have no control. We find no
basis in the act for allowing unions to alter unilaterally the statutory structure so carefully elucidated by the Supreme Court.
Id. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260 (footnote omitted).
170. See Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 88; Granite States, 409 U.S. at 216-17; Scofield,
394 U.S. at 435.
171. See, e.g., Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 89; O.K. Tool Co., 215 N.L.R.B. at 652-53;
Dalmo Victor I, 231 N.L.R.B. at 720-21.
172. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1217.
173. Id.
174. Id. Following the Ninth Circuit's argument to its logical extreme, a union rule
must fail under the Scofield test. If all three parts of the test are mutually exclusive and
require no balancing, then the interest of the union in maintaining solidarity has no place in
the analysis of the second part of the test. The inquiry into union interests should only take
place under the first part. A rule that impairs a policy embedded in the labor laws, however,
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court concluded that it should construe Scofield narrowly.'7 5 Acknowledging that an employee has a section 7 right to resign from
the union, the court, nonetheless, ruled that when a union representative simply fines a resigned member for strikebreaking, the
union has not coerced or restrained the employee in the exercise of
his section 7 rights. 78 According to the court, the union has put
"some obstacles in the way of resignation," but it has not impaired
177
federal labor policy.
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning is flawed. First, the court ignores the Supreme Court's holding in Granite State that fines constitute restraint and coercion within the meaning of section
8(b)(1)(A). 178 Second, the fine might impair the employee's section
7 rights if it is large enough to prevent him from exercising his
right to resign, especially if he desires to return to work for eco179
nomic reasons.
The Ninth Circuit was correct in asserting that a rule restricting resignations implicates the union's interest in regulating the
acquisition and retention of membership as well as the employee's
interest in being free to refrain from collective activity. These two
interests inherently conflict. If the court enforces the restriction on
resignations, the employee's interest becomes subservient to the
union's interest. On the other hand, if the court refuses to enforce
the restriction on resignations, the court explicitly favors the
employee.
The Ninth Circuit stated that it should not balance these competing interests because they are equally important. 8 0 The Seventh Circuit, however, engaged in the necessary balancing and concluded that a union's interest in preserving solidarity cannot
override an employee's right to resign.' 8 ' Relying on the Court's
is invalid because the rule fails the second part of the test.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 216. In Neufeld Porsche-Audithe Board also criticized
the Ninth Circuit for this argument. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1262.
179. The employees in Neufeld Porsche-Audi were fined $2250, Neufeld PorscheAudi, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1258, while the employees in RockfordBeloit were fined the salary that they earned while working during the strike, RockfordBeloit, 724 F.2d at 58. In Dalmo Victor I the union fined the employees the amount each
employee received as strike benefits while out on strike-2227.50 for two employees, and
$1125 for the third. Dalmo Victor I, 231 N.L.R.B. at 720.
180. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1216-17.
181. Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d at 60.
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reasoning in Granite State, the Seventh Circuit ruled that although the union has a powerful interest in solidarity and conformity during a strike, the employee's section 7 rights must remain preeminent." 2 As Chief Justice Burger stated in his
concurring opinion in Granite State:
[T]he institutional needs of the Union . . . do not outweigh the rights and
needs of the individual. . . . [W]e have given special protection to the associational rights of individuals in a variety of contexts; through [section] 7 of
the Labor Act, Congress has manifested its concern with those rights in the
specific context of our national scheme of collective bargaining. Where the
individual employee has freely chosen to exercise his legal right to abandon
the privileges of union membership, it is not for us to impose the obligations
of continued membership. 83

The Board in Neufeld Porsche-Audi also employed this balancing
approach and thereby reaffirmed the position that the concurrence
established in Dalmo Victor 11.181
2.

The Employee's Rights Under the Act

In Scofield the Supreme Court delineated a second reason to
hold that an employee's section 7 right to refrain from union activities overrides the union's institutional interest. In establishing the
second part of the test, the Scofield Court relied on NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers.1 5 Marine
182. Id.
183. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 218 (Burger, C.J., concurring), cited in Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d at 60.
184. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1261. In
Dalmo Victor II the concurrence stated:
[The argument] that neither the employee rights at issue nor the union interests being
advanced are absolute ... implicitly equate[s] the express Section 7 rights of employees with a union's institutional interest in strike solidarity ....
Yet, such an equation
ignores the fact that it is not the mere existence of conflict between labor disputants
that mandates and justifies an "accommodation" or "balancing.". . . We contend most
strongly that the express Section 7 rights of employees are surely more than mere "interests" subject to limitation because their operation somehow impinges upon the institutional desires of a union .... Thus, under the banner of "balancing," our colleagues
negate ... the express employee protections afforded by one of the Act's most important provisions.
Dalmo Victor II, 263 N.L.R.B. at 990-91 (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter, Member,
concurring).
The Seventh Circuit added that an employee has a strong personal interest in preserving his right to resign. A union rule restricting resignations and compelling membership
infringes on this interest and the employee's § 7 rights. Rockford-Beloit, 724 F.2d at 60. The
court cited two employee interests: (1) the freedom to change opinions regarding the effectiveness of a strike; and (2) the employee's need to return to work for personal reasons,
including family hardship. Id.
185. 391 U.S. 418 (1968) (Marine Workers).
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Workers required a member to exhaust union remedies before
filing an unfair labor practice grievance with the Board. 186 The Supreme Court struck down the rule because it frustrated the enforcement scheme of the Act and because the rule circumvented
the Act's policy of allowing employees to bring complaints to the
17
Board.

Similarly, any rule restricting resignation violates the Act's
policy of allowing employees to exercise openly their section 7
rights. Admittedly, a union's interest in maintaining its solidarity
in the face of a strike may be greater than the union's interest in
ensuring that it has the first chance to resolve an employee's problem. The Scofield test, however, does not take into consideration
88
the degree to which a rule impairs a policy imbedded in the Act.1
A rule restricting resignations also impairs the section 8(b)(2)
policy of allowing an employee to refuse to become a full member
of the union.' 89 In unions with a union security clause in the collective bargaining agreement, the member has no choice but to join
the union. 190 Under section 8(b)(2), a union commits an unfair labor practice if it discriminates or causes the employer to discriminate against an employee who has been expelled from the union
for any reason other than the failure to pay dues. 9 ' The extent of
an employee's obligation under a union-security agreement thus is
"whittled down to its financial core.'

92

A rule restricting resigna-

tions, which the union imposes on an employee who must maintain
membership according to a union-security clause, undermines the
employee's right to limit his membership to a financial obligation.
186. Id. at 420-21.
187. Id. at 425. One commentator maintained that a union is free to regulate its internal affairs unless exercise of that freedom would violate the rights of others protected by the
Act. For instance, this commentator argued that in Marine Workers the union infringed on
the right of the NLRB itself to secure employee access to Board process. Silard, supra note
17, at 196.
188. See Johannesen, supra note 2, at 275.
189. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260 &
n.15; see supra note 24 (text of § 8(b)(2)). The Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit both
failed to address this policy argument.
190. Section 8(a)(3) of the Act permits a union and an employer to write a unionsecurity clause into the employment contract. 29 U.S.C. § 148(a)(3) (1982); see J.R. DEMPSEY, THE OPERATION OF THE RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS (1961) (discussing the techniques of
union security); see also F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 235. Even without a
union-security clause, the member might not have joined the union voluntarily, but may
have succumbed to pressure from his peers and the union, or he may have assumed mistakenly that a union-security clause actually did exist.
191. 29 U.S.C. § 148(b)(2) (1982).
192. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963); see supra note 19.
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A restriction on resignations would extend this right beyond a
financial obligation to forced employee observance of a picket line
for the duration of the strike. The union's unilateral creation of
the fiction of continued membership clearly impairs the policy imbedded in section 8(b)(2).
3. The Neutrality of the Act
In Neufeld Porsche-Audi the Board recognized that a union
rule restricting resignations would impair the neutrality of the Act
by distinguishing between employees who wish to engage in concerted activities and employees who desire to refrain from those
activities. 193 The Board felt that if it sanctioned union efforts to
restrict resignations, implicitly it would favor striking employees at
the expense of employees who chose not to strike. This kind of
compromise, the Board declared, would ignore the literal prescription of section 7 to protect the rights of employees to engage in or
refrain from union or other concerted activities. 94
Traditionally, the neutrality of the Act has come to mean
achieving equality of bargaining power between employers and unions through the free play of economic forces. 95 The Board's contention, however, is not without merit. Congress enacted sections 7
and 8(b)(1) to curb union abuses under the Wagner Act.196 Congress also designed section 8(b)(1) to hold the agents of a labor
organization, generally employees, liable for restraining or coercing
fellow employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. 97 The
adoption of section 8(b)(1) demonstrates Congress' intent to strike
a balance between employees who favor the union and employees
98
who do not wish to participate in concerted activities.
193.
194.
195.
U.S. 157
196.

Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1261.
Id.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 936, 946 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 404
(1971).
See 93 CONG. REc. 4142, reprintedin 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 165, at
1025; 93 CONG. REc. 3554, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 165, at 647.
197. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 4143, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIV HISTORY, supra note
165, at 1028.
198. In Rockford-Beloit the Seventh Circuit made passing reference to this policy. 724
F.2d at 60 ("[Florced continued membership distorts the balance between encouraging collective activity among workers and protecting individuals from coercion."). In Dalmo Victor

II, however, the Ninth Circuit did not address this issue. Instead, the Ninth Circuit attempted to assert a countervailing policy based on the mutual reliance theory. The court
contended that "members who participate in the strike vote and then fail to honor the
result [breach] a promise to their colleagues." Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1217. The Supreme Court should reject the Ninth Circuit's assertion for two reasons. First, in Granite
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4.

Summary

Three policy reasons exist for concluding that a rule restricting resignations does not satisfy the second part of the Scofield
test and, therefore, violates section 8(b)(1)(A). First, a rule restricting resignations frustrates the overriding policy in section 7
that employees remain free to choose whether to engage in concerted activities. Second, the rule violates the employee's section 7
and section 8(b)(2) rights. Last, a rule restricting resignations impairs the neutrality of the Act by distinguishing between employees who wish to engage in concerted activities and employees who
desire to refrain from those activities.
C. A Union Rule Must Be Reasonably Enforced Against Members
Who Are Free to Leave the Union and Escape the Rule
The specific language of the third part of the Scofield test is
inapplicable to the issue of restricting resignations. In Scofield the
Court reviewed a rule regarding union-imposed production ceilings. 199 For the rule to be valid, the Court said, the rule must be
"reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave
the union and escape the rule."2 00 A rule restricting production
ceilings, however, differs dramatically from a rule restricting resignations. The language in Scofield, read in the context of a rule restricting resignations, automatically would invalidate the rule because a union member cannot be "free to leave the union and
escape the rule" when the rule restricts the member's right to resign. This interpretation would make the first two parts of the
Scofield test meaningless and would give too much weight to what
is arguably dicta in the opinion. Neither the Seventh Circuit nor
State the Court expressly rejected the mutual reliance theory. "[Tihe vitality of [section] 7
requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in
May and that his [section] 7 rights are not lost by a union's plea for solidarity or by its
pressures for conformity and submission to its regime." 409 U.S. at 217-18. If the member
must be free to refrain from actions he endorsed earlier, and he does not lose his § 7 rights
to a union's plea for solidarity, the Ninth Circuit is not justified in putting a union's need
for solidarity above an employee's § 7 rights.
Second, participation in the strike vote does not necessarily mean that the employee
voted in favor of the walkout. If an employee voted against the strike, a rule restricting his
right to resign compels him to participate in a concerted activity that he opposed and makes
a mockery of his § 7 right to refrain from striking. On the other hand, if the employee voted
in favor of the strike, his vote still should not operate to waive his § 7 rights because the
court has given him the privilege to change his mind about the effectiveness of the strike
and its impact on him. Id. at 218.
199. Scofield, 394 U.S. at 424-26.
200. Id. at 430.
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the Ninth Circuit addressed this inherent tension, however.
In Dalmo Victor 11 the Ninth Circuit ignored the problem of
applying the third part of the Scofield test to the rule restricting
resignations by excising from the test the words "who are free to
leave the union and escape the rule.

' 20 1

Although the Scofield

Court did not focus extensively on this language, the Court's use of
these words demonstrates that the Court gave at least some weight
to a union member's right to resign from the union and escape its
union rule. The Court reiterated this concern in Granite State by
quoting the Scofield language. 202 The Ninth Circuit's failure to dis-

cuss this language, therefore, is untenable.
In Rockford-Beloit, on the other hand, the Seventh Circuit
found central to the Supreme Court's analysis in Scofield the "concept that union members were free to leave the union and escape
the rule."203 Although the Seventh Circuit focused on the second
part of the test, the court supported its conclusion by stating that
the third part "safeguards the balance between individual rights
and the collective power of the union. "204 Arguably, this analysis
overstates the Scofield Court's emphasis on the employee's freedom to resign. If the Court's meaning was this clear, the Seventh
Circuit would not have needed to consider the second part of the
test at all.
The most practical resolution of the tension between the language in the third part of the Scofield test and the union rule is to
conclude that the Scofield Court intended to give some weight to
the member's freedom to leave the union, but intended to place
major emphasis on the second prong of the test. This interpretation is similar to the Seventh Circuit's approach and would have
the same result. Under this analysis, the rule restricting resignations still would fail the Scofield test and violate section
8(b)(1)(A).
V.

CONCLUSION

This Recent Development has argued that a union violates
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act when the
union imposes a rule restricting the rights of its members to resign.
The Supreme Court should apply the Scofield test, as modified by
201.

725 F.2d at 1216. In describing the third part of the Scofield test, the court

merely stated that the union rule must be "reasonably enforced against union members." Id.
202. GraniteState, 409 U.S. at 216; see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
203. 724 F.2d at 61.
204. Id.
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this Recent Development, to reach this outcome. The union rule
probably satisfies the first prong of the Scofield test when the
union advances its need for maintaining strike solidarity as a legitimate union interest. The second prong of the test, which focuses
on whether a union rule violates federal labor policy, is the most
significant part of the test. A union rule that restricts resignations
fails to meet this prong because it infringes on an employee's section 7 right to refrain from union activities. While a union has an
institutional interest in maintaining strike solidarity, the union interest should not outweigh the section 7 right imbedded in the National Labor Relations Act.
The third prong of the Scofield test mandates that a rule must
be reasonably enforced against union members who are free to resign from the union and escape the rule. Courts should utilize this
prong only to reinforce the second part of the test. The Supreme
Court's emphasis on the member's freedom to leave the union and
escape a union rule indicates that the employee's section 7 rights
are paramount to the union's institutional interest in maintaining
union strength. To give the third prong additional weight would be
to ignore the first two prongs of the test and any union interest in
imposing restrictions. The Supreme Court, therefore, should hold
that any union restriction on a member's right to resign constitutes
an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National
Labor Relations Act.
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